RFR: 8264130: PAC-RET protection for Linux/AArch64 [v4]
Alan Hayward
duke at openjdk.java.net
Mon Nov 15 11:24:46 UTC 2021
On Mon, 15 Nov 2021 10:15:41 GMT, Andrew Haley <aph at openjdk.org> wrote:
>> Alan Hayward has updated the pull request with a new target base due to a merge or a rebase. The pull request now contains eight commits:
>>
>> - Merge master
>> - Document pauth functions && remove OS split
>> - Update UseROPProtection description
>> - Simplify branch protection configure check
>> - 8264130: PAC-RET protection for Linux/AArch64
>>
>> PAC is an optional feature in AArch64 8.3 and is compulsory in v9. One
>> of its uses is to protect against ROP based attacks. This is done by
>> signing the Link Register whenever it is stored on the stack, and
>> authenticating the value when it is loaded back from the stack. If an
>> attacker were to try to change control flow by editing the stack then
>> the authentication check of the Link Register will fail, causing a
>> segfault when the function returns.
>>
>> On a system with PAC enabled, it is expected that all applications will
>> be compiled with ROP protection. Fedora 33 and upwards already provide
>> this. By compiling for ARMv8.0, GCC and LLVM will only use the set of
>> PAC instructions that exist in the NOP space - on hardware without PAC,
>> these instructions act as NOPs, allowing backward compatibility for
>> negligible performance cost (2 NOPs per non-leaf function).
>>
>> Hardware is currently limited to the Apple M1 MacBooks. All testing has
>> been done within a Fedora Docker image. A run of SpecJVM showed no
>> difference to that of noise - which was surprising.
>>
>> The most important part of this patch is simply compiling using branch
>> protection provided by GCC/LLVM. This protects all C++ code from being
>> used in ROP attacks, removing all static ROP gadgets from use.
>>
>> The remainder of the patch adds ROP protection to runtime generated
>> code, in both stubs and compiled Java code. Attacks here are much harder
>> as ROP gadgets must be found dynamically at runtime. If/when AOT
>> compilation is added to JDK, then all stubs and compiled Java will be
>> susceptible ROP gadgets being found by static analysis and therefore
>> potentially as vulnerable as C++ code.
>>
>> There are a number of places where the VM changes control flow by
>> rewriting the stack or otherwise. I’ve done some analysis as to how
>> these could also be used for attacks (which I didn’t want to post here).
>> These areas can be protected ensuring the pointers to various stubs and
>> entry points are stored in memory as signed pointers. These changes are
>> simple to make (they can be reduced to a type change in common code and
>> a few addition sign/auth calls in the backend), but there a lot of them
>> and the total code change is fairly large. I’m happy to provide a few
>> work in progress patches.
>>
>> In order to match the security benefits of the Apple Arm64e ABI across
>> the whole of JDK, then all the changes mentioned above would be
>> required.
>> - Add PAC assembly instructions
>> - Add AArch64 ROP protection runtime flag
>> - Build with branch protection
>
> src/hotspot/cpu/aarch64/c1_Runtime1_aarch64.cpp line 452:
>
>> 450: // patch the return address, this stub will directly return to the exception handler
>> 451: __ str(r0, Address(rfp, 1*BytesPerWord));
>> 452:
>
> Please explain the reason for this change, that leaves `lr` live across `restore_live_registers()`.
In the original code:
*save r0 to the lr location on the stack
*restore_live_registers
*Standard return: remove stack frame, load lr and fp off the stack, jump to lr.
With PAC it would now be:
*Sign r0 then save it to the lr location on the stack
*restore_live_registers
*Standard return: remove stack frame, load lr and fp off the stack, auth lr, jump to lr.
After reading the code in restore_live_registers, it doesn't touch lr and so seemed odd to have the save to the stack, only to restore it directly afterwards.
-------------
PR: https://git.openjdk.java.net/jdk/pull/6334
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