RFR: 8348828: Windows dll loading now resolves symlinks [v10]

[Benjamin Peterson]

On Mon, 15 Dec 2025 17:31:20 GMT, Benjamin Peterson <duke at openjdk.org> wrote:

>> Deep in the bowels of `System.loadLibrary`, `File.getCanonicalPath()` is called on the target library file before it is passed to the system library loading APIs. In JDK-8003887, `File.getCanonicalPath` was altered to resolve symlinks on Windows. This had unintended consequences for passing a symlink to `System.loadLibrary` on Windows. The underlying Windows `LoadLibrary` API inspects the file name passed to it and adds a `.dll` extension if the it is not already present. Thus, if `System.loadLibrary` was given a symlink to a file and that file didn't have a `.dll` extension, `LoadLibrary` try to load nonexistent file and fail.
>> 
>> Fix this problem by appending a `.` to library paths in Windows' `os::dll_load`. This trailing dot inhibits `LoadLibrary`'s own appending behavior.
>
> Benjamin Peterson has updated the pull request with a new target base due to a merge or a rebase. The pull request now contains 16 commits:
> 
>  - Merge branch 'master' into nativelibraries-fix
>  - add test showing loading symlinked libraries with various combinations
>  - revert dll_load fix
>  - Merge branch 'master' into nativelibraries-fix
>  - add cast
>  - use os::malloc
>  - Merge branch 'master' into nativelibraries-fix
>  - fix compilation
>  - fix grammar
>  - add dot in os::dll_load rather than NativeLibraries.java
>  - ... and 6 more: https://git.openjdk.org/jdk/compare/ad29642d...d03535ce

Any security progress in the new year?

-------------

PR Comment: https://git.openjdk.org/jdk/pull/24694#issuecomment-3745080385