RFR: 8293368: GitHub Workflows security hardening

[Kevin Rushforth]

On Thu, 1 Sep 2022 20:37:27 GMT, Alex <duke at openjdk.org> wrote:

> This PR adds explicit [permissions section](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions) to workflows. This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with [extended set of permissions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/automatic-token-authentication#permissions-for-the-github_token) (except from `on: pull_request` [from external forks](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)). By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an [injection](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/) or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted.
> It is recommended to have [most strict permissions on the top level](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#token-permissions) and grant write permissions on [job level](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/assigning-permissions-to-jobs) case by case.

Your GHA tests look good. Can you merge (_not_ rebase) the current upstream master into your branch? A recent commit that is not currently in your branch also touches `submit.yml` and I'd like to see a run with both fixes (also, since that patch touches adjacent lines, it will be helpful to see the results of the merge before integration).

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PR: https://git.openjdk.org/jfx/pull/889