RFR: 8293368: GitHub Workflows security hardening [v2]

[Alex]

On Wed, 7 Sep 2022 11:27:02 GMT, Alex <duke at openjdk.org> wrote:

>> This PR adds explicit [permissions section](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions) to workflows. This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with [extended set of permissions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/automatic-token-authentication#permissions-for-the-github_token) (except from `on: pull_request` [from external forks](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)). By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an [injection](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/) or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted.
>> It is recommended to have [most strict permissions on the top level](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#token-permissions) and grant write permissions on [job level](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/assigning-permissions-to-jobs) case by case.
>
> Alex has updated the pull request with a new target base due to a merge or a rebase. The incremental webrev excludes the unrelated changes brought in by the merge/rebase. The pull request contains two additional commits since the last revision:
> 
>  - Merge branch 'master' into patch-1
>  - Update submit.yml
>    
>    Signed-off-by: sashashura <93376818+sashashura at users.noreply.github.com>

Thanks, I missed that the ball in on my side.

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PR: https://git.openjdk.org/jfx/pull/889