<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<p>Hi John,<br>
</p>
<p>Yes, the second call must throw IllegalStateException. See the
class description in javax.crypto.Cipher where it talks about AEAD
modes and AAD processing. It states that all AAD has to be
supplied before update and/or doFinal methods are invoked. This
constraint is also talked about in Cipher.updateAAD's javadoc.<br>
</p>
Thanks for the catch on the double-space.<br>
<br>
--Jamil<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 05/18/2018 04:06 PM,
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:sha.jiang@oracle.com">sha.jiang@oracle.com</a> wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:6cd74c4b-649d-d7b8-4f1d-2d1ddb07a5c4@oracle.com">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<p>Hi Jamil,<br>
<br>
-- ChaCha20Cipher.java<br>
430 } else if (aadDone) {<br>
431 // No AAD updates allowed after the PT/CT
update method is called<br>
432 throw new IllegalStateException("Attempted to
update AAD on " +<br>
433 "Cipher after plaintext/ciphertext
update");<br>
<br>
Please consider the below case,<br>
cipher.updateAAD();<br>
cipher.update();<br>
cipher.updateAAD();<br>
Should the second call on updateAAD() throw
IllegalStateException?<br>
<br>
Minor: Two spaces between "method" and "is" on line 431.<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
John Jiang<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 17/05/2018 03:05, Jamil Nimeh
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:f9ed5e08-0ad8-cacb-ac95-b6796984e844@oracle.com">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=utf-8">
<p>Round 6.</p>
<p>This brings ChaCha20/ChaCha20-Poly1305 into conformance with
Cipher's specification when forms of init that take
AlgorithmParameters or AlgorithmParameterSpec are used.
Previously, a non-null AP or APS object was required. In
order to better conform to the specification, if a null AP or
APS is provided for these ciphers, a random nonce will be
generated and the counter will be set to 1, just as is
currently done with valid forms of init that don't take an AP
or APS object (e.g. Cipher.init(int, Key, SecureRandom) ).
Per the spec in Cipher, this is only true for ENCRYPT_MODE and
will throw InvalidKeyException when done in DECRYPT_MODE.</p>
<p>I also added a few test cases that exercise these code paths
in the ChaCha20Poly1305Parameters.java test case.<br>
</p>
<p><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://cr.openjdk.java.net/%7Ejnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.06/"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~jnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.06/</a></p>
<p>Thanks,</p>
<p>--Jamil<br>
</p>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 05/04/2018 07:06 AM, Jamil Nimeh
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:d50c2610-42d9-64f0-8a91-796c2588fcf9@oracle.com">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=utf-8">
<p>Round 5.</p>
<p>This adds Sean's comments. Sean, I was never able to
execute a case on init where a half-baked object would
fail. In most cases it would fail in checks in
javax.crypto.Cipher before it ever made it down to my code.
I'm pretty confident the init sequence is OK. I did move
the setting of a few data members toward the end of the init
sequence but setting the key and nonce is necessary before
creating the initial state, which is then used for
generating an authentication key for AEAD mode and
generating keystream.<br>
</p>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://cr.openjdk.java.net/%7Ejnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.04/"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~jnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.05</a><br>
<br>
Also the CSR has been finalized and can be found here:<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8198925"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8198925</a><br>
<br>
--Jamil<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 04/27/2018 02:21 PM, Jamil
Nimeh wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:e1877cbe-c013-d7ab-a4c3-8c1bc6a4edd4@oracle.com">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=utf-8">
<p>Round 4 of updates for ChaCha20 and ChaCha20-Poly1305,
minor stuff mostly:</p>
<ul>
<li>Added words in the description of javax.crypto.Cipher
recommending callers reinitialize the Cipher to use
different nonces after each complete encryption or
decryption (similar language to what exists already for
AES-GCM encryption).</li>
<li>Added an additional test case for ChaCha20NoReuse</li>
<li>Made accessor methods for ChaCha20ParameterSpec final
and cleaned up the code a bit based on comments from the
field.</li>
</ul>
<p><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://cr.openjdk.java.net/%7Ejnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.04/"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~jnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.04/</a></p>
<p>Thanks!</p>
<p>--Jamil<br>
</p>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 04/13/2018 11:59 AM, Jamil
Nimeh wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:4cdfa771-b222-2986-b1fa-2a67a89b9212@oracle.com">Round
3 of updates for ChaCha20 and ChaCha20-Poly1305: <br>
<br>
* Removed the key field in ChaCha20 and Poly1305
implementations and only retain the key bytes as an object
field (thanks Thomas for catching this) <br>
<br>
* Added additional protections against key/nonce reuse.
This is a behavioral change to ChaCha20 and
ChaCha20-Poly1305. Instances of these ciphers will no
longer allow you to do subsequent doUpdate/doFinal calls
after the first doFinal without re-initializing the cipher
with either a new key or nonce. Attempting to reuse the
cipher without a new initialization will throw an
IllegalStateException. This is similar to the behavior of
AES-GCM in encrypt mode, but for ChaCha20 it needs to be
done for both encrypt and decrypt. <br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://cr.openjdk.java.net/%7Ejnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.03/"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~jnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.03/</a>
<br>
<br>
Thanks, <br>
--Jamil <br>
<br>
On 04/10/2018 03:34 PM, Jamil Nimeh wrote: <br>
<blockquote type="cite">Hello everyone, <br>
<br>
This is a quick update to the previous webrev: <br>
<br>
* When using the form of engineInit that does only takes
op, key and random, the nonce will always be random even
if the random parameter is null. A default instance of
SecureRandom will be used to create the nonce in this
case, instead of all zeroes. <br>
<br>
* Unused debug code was removed from the
ChaCha20Cipher.java file <br>
<br>
* ChaCha20Parameters.engineToString no longer obtains
the line separator from a System property directly. It
calls System.lineSeparator() similar to how other
AlgorithmParameter classes in com.sun.crypto.provider do
it. <br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://cr.openjdk.java.net/%7Ejnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.02/"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~jnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.02/</a>
<br>
<br>
Thanks, <br>
<br>
--Jamil <br>
<br>
<br>
On 03/26/2018 12:08 PM, Jamil Nimeh wrote: <br>
<blockquote type="cite">Hello all, <br>
<br>
This is a request for review for the ChaCha20 and
ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher implementations. Links to
the webrev and the JEP which outlines the
characteristics and behavior of the ciphers are listed
below. <br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://cr.openjdk.java.net/%7Ejnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.01/"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~jnimeh/reviews/8153028/webrev.01/</a>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://openjdk.java.net/jeps/329"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://openjdk.java.net/jeps/329</a>
<br>
<br>
Thanks, <br>
--Jamil <br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>