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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 8/20/2022 2:08 PM, David Hook wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:6f95c68c-4cc6-a039-189e-1d4b75b16ca1@cryptoworkshop.com">
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Michael,</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">I don't know anything about
bureaucrats, I am an engineer. You may need to consult someone
else on bureaucrats. <br>
</div>
<p>I apologize for my apparent deficiencies in this area, but
would you mind explaining how Cipher.wrap() is either supposed
to take a public key and create an encapsulation based on it and
return a secret key implicitly in one clean move, or why it even
makes sense to do so. The method was never conceived as
providing the functionality for what a KEM actually does, and
when I did the initial PKCS11 implementation at Eracom in the
late 90's and the team at Sun added the wrap/unwrap functions to
support it, this is definitely not was intended either - it was
for explicit key wrapping based on the key that was passed to
Cipher.init().</p>
</blockquote>
<p>First - PKCS11 is a 40 year old API that probably needs to be
retired. I spent the better part of 2 years working with the
PKCS11 Oasis group trying to get them to properly support master
secrets and KDFs and failed utterly. You should not use PKCS11
as an example that the JCE should use as a goal. <br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>At the base, a java class is a collection of objects. A Cipher
object <br>
</p>
<p>Let's build a non-parameterized ECIES-KEM which implicitly uses
AES256 bit keys to key a GCM cipher, and a KDF based on SP800-108
counter mode with SHA256 as the underlying hash, and with a well
known label and context for the KDF since there is a new key for
every wrap.</p>
<p>1) Implement CipherSpi - <br>
</p>
<p>public class EciesKemCipher extends CipherSpi {</p>
<p> private KeyAgreement ka;<br>
private Cipher gcm;<br>
private KeyPair kp;<br>
private KeyPairGenerator kg;</p>
<p> EciesKemCipher() {<br>
ka = KeyAgreement.getInstance("ECDH");<br>
kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance ("EC");<br>
gcm = Cipher.getInstance ("AES/GCM/NoPadding");<br>
</p>
<p> }</p>
<p> // implement a single example<br>
</p>
<p> @override <br>
protected void engineInit (int opMode, Key key, SecureRandom
dontcare) {</p>
<p> switch (opMode) {<br>
Cipher.MODE_WRAP:<br>
initWrap((ECPublicKey) key); <br>
break;<br>
default:<br>
// unimpl<br>
}<br>
}</p>
<p> private void initWrap (ECPublicKey k) {</p>
<p> ECParameterSpec spec = k.getParams();<br>
kpg.initialize(spec);<br>
kp = kpg.genKeyPair();<br>
ka.init (kp.getPrivate());<br>
ka.doPhase (k, true);<br>
byte[] sharedSecret = ka.generateSecret();</p>
<p> byte[] keyStream = kdf(sharedSecret, 32 + 12); //
output 44 bytes for Key and IV<br>
SecretKeySpec gcmKey = new SecretKeySpec (keyStream, 0,
32, "AES");<br>
IvParameterSpec gcmIv = new IVParameterSpec(keyStream,
32, 12);<br>
</p>
<p> gcm.init (Cipher.MODE_ENCRYPT, gcmKey, gcmIv);<br>
// all ready to go<br>
} <br>
<br>
</p>
<p> protected byte[] engineWrap (Key k) {</p>
<p> ByteBuffer outData = ByteBuffer.allocate
(k.getEncoded().length + kp.getPublic().getEncoded().length) + 16;</p>
<p> // Place a copy of the ephemeral public key I
generated in init here for the use of the receiver.<br>
outData.put (kp.getEncoded());<br>
// One s<br>
outData.put (gcm.doFinal(k.getEncoded());</p>
<p> outData.flip();<br>
byte[] result = outdata.remaining();</p>
<p> outData.get(result);<br>
// kp = null; clear cipher if it hasn't already been
cleared, clear ka if necessary (e.g. un-init)<br>
</p>
<p> return result;<br>
}<br>
</p>
<p> ... and unwrap and kdf function<br>
}</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>2) Implement a provider and add the above. <br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:6f95c68c-4cc6-a039-189e-1d4b75b16ca1@cryptoworkshop.com">
<p>On BC's part, we've already implemented RFC 5990/SP 800-56B in
Java and the experience has, at best, been awkward. The new
algorithms have moved awkward to inappropriate. With the new
algorithms, there's no longer only one case of this, it's not an
outlier, there should be a general way of supporting KEMs in the
API that doesn't involve over engineering KeyGenerator and
Cipher.<br>
</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There's a big difference between the API and your underlying
implementation. Everything you want to do can be done using the
current APIs. As I said before, Cipher.wrap/unwrap are the
appropriate APIs for this as they meet the contract requirements
you need. Most Ciphers require some extra data -e.g. IVs - that
have to either be carried or implicitly derived. In this case,
what needs to be carried in addition to the encrypted key material
is at least the ephemeral public key the wrapper creates. I used
a very simple encoding scheme above and this assumes that both
ends know exactly what "ECIES-KEM" means. Obviously, there are
100s of possible combinations of parameters and KDFs and key wrap
algorithms. What I would suggest is heading over to LAMPS at the
IETF and proposing a data encoding scheme for carrying the
parameters. Once you have that done, then come here and map JCE
names against parameter sets to close the loop. It won't require
an API change.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:6f95c68c-4cc6-a039-189e-1d4b75b16ca1@cryptoworkshop.com">
<p> </p>
<p>I work with a team that has had to implement all of them and
had to make them fit into the JCA. We have done so. Like John, I
am simply relaying our experience. In about 18 months these
algorithms are going to become mandatory, what all of us think
is irrelevant. We, for our part, already have a solution, but we
both realize it's not "the solution" - we recognize that the JVM
is uniquely positioned to provide leadership on this and provide
a universal way of doing it.<br>
</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Then suggest an API and we'll start knocking it around. I
personally don't think its necessary at this time and will add to
API bloat.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:6f95c68c-4cc6-a039-189e-1d4b75b16ca1@cryptoworkshop.com">
<p> </p>
<p>Of course, if it's felt that these algorithms should be
ignored, it's not my place to revolt, although I do feel obliged
to argue. I will simply try and do the best by my users, as I
have no doubt will John. Both of us have simply offered our
comments in good faith and to alert the community that things
have changed and that with these new algorithms there is room
for a new approach. The ambiguity about how these algorithms can
be implemented and the excessive need to fallback on propritary
classes for them does suggest that there are some additions to
the JCA which would help. I appreciate to understand this
statement does involve actually understanding what these
algorithms do and may require some additional reading. <br>
</p>
<p>As I said, I'm an engineer, my users will be able to use these
algorithms properly, my team will ensure that, as I have no
doubt will John's. What John and myself, apparently mistakenly,
care about is that our users should also be able to use these
algorithms portably.</p>
<p>Are you saying portability is no longer a consideration?<br>
</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I have no idea where you got that idea.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:6f95c68c-4cc6-a039-189e-1d4b75b16ca1@cryptoworkshop.com">
<p> </p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>David<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 21/8/22 02:23, Michael StJohns
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:783df5b7-e30f-08e7-dbc3-e3d95f427c18@comcast.net">
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charset=UTF-8">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi David/John -</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">I would submit that you're trying
too hard to make your life simple! :-)</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Cipher.wrap/unwrap are the correct
methods.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">For example: <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Cipher kem = Cipher.getInstance
("ECIES/GCM-128-64/KDF-SP800-108-COUNTER-SHA256");</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">kem.init (Cipher.WRAP_MODE,
pubkey);</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">byte[] opaqueEncapsulatedKey =
kem.wrap (someOtherKey);</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">The "opaqueEncapsulatedKey" would
contain the data needed by the unwrap function - specifically
a) the ecies ephemeral public key, b) the fact that the
derived key is a GCM key of length 128 and that the GCM tag is
64 bytes long, c) the KDF, d) (optional) any mixins other than
defaults required by the KDF - which would be passed in a
parameter blob during init. Cipher would NOT return the
underlying generated secret used to wrap the key. Just the
public part of the key pair used to do the ECDH operation
against the passed in public key. In the RSA case, the
wrapped encrypting secret would be an opaque data blob and
would be part of the data passed to the unwrap function.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">If you want a key generated for
other purposes, then the right thing is using a KDF and a Key
agreement function in tandem. Strangely the KDF appears in
the javacard API for 3.1, but not in the JCE/JDK API.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">"What's the difference between a
bureaucrat and an engineer? A bureaucrat takes small solvable
pieces and combines them into one insoluble mass."</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">In this case, Java provides a
number of flexible primitives that can be combined as needed.
In this case, the underlying Cipher implementation would wrap
key agreement and kdf and cipher (GCM) instances. It should
return UnsupportedOperationException for all operations
execept wrap/unwrap and the appropriate init methods.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Later, Mike<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 8/19/2022 6:38 PM, David Hook
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:d511fabf-74dd-ec49-b686-a90eca14861a@cryptoworkshop.com">
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charset=UTF-8">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Mike,</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">KEMs can be used for key wrapping
- we've actually implemented support for this too. But they
are not actually key wrapping ciphers.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Here's a simple example of using
Kyber for key wrapping in BC:</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">
<pre style="background-color:#ffffff;color:#080808;font-family:'JetBrains Mono',monospace;font-size:11.3pt;"><span style="color:#000000;">SecretKey key </span>= <span style="color:#0033b3;">new </span>SecretKeySpec(<span style="color:#000000;">keyBytes</span>, <span style="color:#067d17;">"AES"</span>);
<span style="color:#000000;">w1</span>.init(<span style="color:#000000;">Cipher</span>.<span style="color:#871094;font-style:italic;">WRAP_MODE</span>, kp.getPublic(), <span style="color:#0033b3;">new </span>KEMParameterSpec(<span style="color:#067d17;">"AES-KWP"</span>));
<span style="color:#0033b3;">byte</span>[] <span style="color:#000000;">data </span>= <span style="color:#000000;">w1</span>.wrap(<span style="color:#000000;">key</span>);
<span style="color:#000000;">Cipher w2 </span>= <span style="color:#000000;">Cipher</span>.<span style="font-style:italic;">getInstance</span>(algorithm, <span style="color:#067d17;">"BCPQC"</span>);
<span style="color:#000000;">w2</span>.init(<span style="color:#000000;">Cipher</span>.<span style="color:#871094;font-style:italic;">UNWRAP_MODE</span>, kp.getPrivate(), <span style="color:#0033b3;">new </span>KEMParameterSpec(<span style="color:#067d17;">"AES-KWP"</span>));
<span style="color:#000000;">Key k </span>= <span style="color:#000000;">w2</span>.unwrap(<span style="color:#000000;">data</span>, <span style="color:#067d17;">"AES"</span>, <span style="color:#000000;">Cipher</span>.<span style="color:#871094;font-style:italic;">SECRET_KEY</span>);
The behavior in this case is in line with what is given in RFC 5990 for the RSA KEM. How it works is by using the key generated
by the KEM to create an AES-KWP key, which is then used to wrap keyBytes. The shortcoming is it means you have to generate the
secret key separately.
This is the problem though - a KEM can actually be used to generate a secret key for other purposes. For example, where
someone is trying to implement a hybrid KAS scheme. But there is currently no mechanism in the Java APIs for being able to
take advantage of this directly, hence our use of the KeyGenerator class and other people's attempts to make use of the KeyAgreement
class. The Cipher.wrap() returns a byte[] - to be used with a KEM for secret generation it would also have to return the
generated secret (I would probably also argue that passing a public key to wrap in order to generate an encapsulation of a
generated encrypted secret was not the correct use of the API either, but the fact remains a byte[] is not really going to cut it).
If you have any further questions, please feel free to ask. For what it is worth, I have been developing providers for the JCE/JCA since
the late 90's and am actually one of the people responsible for the introduction of the existing wrap/unwrap API in the Cipher class.
Thanks,
David
</pre>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 20/8/22 07:53, Mike StJohns
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:814F78E4-9932-427B-8B65-1AFE5F9D32E2@comcast.net">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Hi This implemented as part of Javax.crypto.Cipher. See the Java doc for the wrap and unwrap methods.
Mike
Sent from my iPad
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">On Aug 19, 2022, at 12:56, John Gray <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:John.Gray@entrust.com" moz-do-not-send="true"><John.Gray@entrust.com></a> wrote:
We are starting to make use of the new PQ algorithms adopted by NIST for prototyping and development of standards. In particular we are working on a composite KEM standard:
See: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-kem/" moz-do-not-send="true">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-kem/</a>
However, there is no KEM interface in the JCA (which make sense because these are new algorithms, although RSA-KEM has been out since 2010).
I can add one into our toolkit (and I think David may have already added on into BC), but I assume at some point there will be an official one added in Java and likely it won't be identical to what we do even if it is very close, which would cause backwards compatibility pain... Perhaps we could collaborate on extending the JCA to support KEM? Essentially it requires methods.
ss, ct := encapsulate(PublicKey)
ss := decapsulate(PrivateKey, ct)
-ss is a shared secret (could come back as a Java SecretKey if you wanted as it would usually be used to derive something like an AES afterwards)
-ct is a Cipher Text (a byte array would make sense)
-Public and Private Keys would use the regular public and private key interface.
-An object holding the ss and ct from the encapsulate() method could be returned, with accessor methods to get the ss and ct. It could be called 'EncapsulatedKEMData' for example.
Likely you would want a new type of KEM crypto object (like you have for Signature, MessageDigest, Cipher, Mac, SecureRandom, KeyAgreement.. etc). Calling it KEM would seem to make sense. 😊 It could also use similar calling patterns and have a KEM.initKEM(keypair.getPublic()) or KEM.initKEM(keypair.getPrivate()), and then you would just call KEM.encapsulate() or KEM.decapsulate(ct).
Then algorithms could be registered in providers as usual:
put("KEM.Kyber","com.blah.Kyber")
put("KEM.compositeKEM","com.entrust.toolkit.crypto.kem.compositeKEM")
Then the above methods (encapsulate and decapsulate) could be defined in that new object type. Then we would be able to make use of it and not have to worry about incompatibility issues down the road...
Cheers,
John Gray
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