Code review request, CR 7180038 regression test failure, SSLEngineBadBufferArrayAccess.java
Weijun Wang
weijun.wang at oracle.com
Tue Jul 3 02:40:31 UTC 2012
No new test needed. I only think that you might be able to hack the
current test a little to reproduce this and see if the failure is the
same and if your code change can fix it. There is no need to keep this
hack in your final changeset.
-Max
On 07/03/2012 10:37 AM, Xuelei Fan wrote:
> On 7/3/2012 10:02 AM, Weijun Wang wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 07/03/2012 09:48 AM, Xuelei Fan wrote:
>>> On 7/2/2012 4:35 PM, Weijun Wang wrote:
>>>> I take a look at the test output. When the last handshake starts:
>>>>
>>>> ================
>>>> server unwrap: OK/NEED_TASK, 230/0 bytes
>>>> running delegated task...
>>>> new HandshakeStatus: NEED_WRAP
>>>> ----
>>>> server wrap: OK/NEED_WRAP, 0/86 bytes
>>>> ================
>>>>
>>>> Here the first wrap only generates 86 bytes, I guess that's the
>>>> ServerHello message? It keeps the state at NEED_WRAP but then never
>>>> really generates the Certificate message. What might be the problem?
>>>>
>>> Good catch!
>>>
>>> It was the abbreviated handshaking. I guess that the previous client has
>>> not closed the socket completely, so for *this* handshaking, the
>>> abbreviated handshaking rather than the full handshaking is used.
>>>
>>> For full handshaking, it is the client sending the "Finished" message at
>>> first. However, for abbreviated handshaking, the server send the
>>> "Finished" message at first.
>>>
>>> In the current scenarios, it is expected that the client sends its
>>> application data (26 bytes), and then the server sends its application
>>> data (29 bytes). However, the abbreviated handshaking disorder the
>>> sequence in that it is the sever sends it application data (29 bytes)
>>> before client. In such cases, the following logic does not stand any
>>> more:
>>> if (!closed && (serverOut.remaining() == 0)) {
>>> closed = true;
>>> ...
>>> if (serverIn.remaining() != clientMsg.length) {
>>>
>>> throw new Exception("Client: Data length error");
>>> }
>>> ...
>>> }
>>>
>>> Because the server has not receive the client message when the server
>>> sends its application data.
>>>
>>> I think it is a test issue, the current fix should has already addressed
>>> the issue.
>>
>> That's great.
>>
>> Since the reason is clear, can you reproduce this failure and then
>> confirm the current fix does solve the problem?
>>
> It is possible to reproduce this failure with a new test case. But it is
> pretty hard to reproduce it within this test. I was wondering as it is
> test bug, so we may not want a extra test case to prove that this test
> is correct.
>
> We also have a nested remind that, "IF THIS FAILS, PLEASE REPORT THIS TO
> THE SECURITY TEAM. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RELIABLY DUPLICATE." I think
> it might be OK that we do not reproduce this issue at present.
>
> What do you think?
>
> Thanks,
> Xuelei
>
>> Thanks
>> Max
>>
>>>
>>> Xuelei
>>>
>>>> Thanks
>>>> Max
>>>>
>>>> On 07/02/2012 10:39 AM, Xuelei Fan wrote:
>>>>> Hi Weijun,
>>>>>
>>>>> Would you please review the test update for CR 7180038?
>>>>> http://cr.openjdk.java.net./~xuelei/7180038/webrev.00/
>>>>>
>>>>> We cannot reproduce the issue. However, from the test log, there is two
>>>>> possible issues exposed by this CR.
>>>>> 1. the improper test case senarios of un/wrap()
>>>>> In the test case, the scenarios is
>>>>> unwrap()->wrap()->serverOut.remaining()->"serverIn.remaining() !=
>>>>> clientMsg.length". After the wrap(), the next operation may need to be
>>>>> unwrap() to get more incoming data before comparing serverIn buffer
>>>>> with
>>>>> the expected client message.
>>>>>
>>>>> This fix is trying to do the comparing after the engine has
>>>>> closed.
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. From the log, the engine status and handshaking status move from
>>>>> CLOSED/NOT_HANDSHAKING to OK/FINISHED. FINISHED means the TLS
>>>>> handshaking just finished. As the handshaking should have completed for
>>>>> a while, it does not sound like a correct status change.
>>>>>
>>>>> However, I did not find why this happens. Need more info. So I
>>>>> added
>>>>> a line of log (suggested by Brad Wetmore) to collect the next failure:
>>>>>
>>>>> IF THIS FAILS, PLEASE REPORT THIS TO THE SECURITY TEAM. WE HAVE
>>>>> BEEN UNABLE TO RELIABLY DUPLICATE.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>> Xuelei
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
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