9001039?: DHKeyAgreement calculates wrong TlsPremasterSecret 1 out of 256 times
Xuelei Fan
xuelei.fan at oracle.com
Thu May 23 10:39:57 UTC 2013
On 5/23/2013 6:03 PM, Andrew Hughes wrote:
> ----- Original Message -----
>> On 5/20/2013 5:28 PM, Pasi Eronen wrote:
>>> Hi Xuelei,
>>>
>>> It seems the PKSC11 doesn't actually have this bug.
>>>
>>> P11KeyAgreement has a separate code path for the "TlsPremasterSecret"
>>> algorithm, which strips leading zeroes if the key can be extracted from
>>> the token. (And if the key cannot be extracted, then the token is doing
>>> the premaster secret->master secret computation, and has to do the
>>> stripping -- it can't be done from the Java PKSC11 provider.)
>>>
>> It makes sense to me.
>>
>>> To make sure this behavior doesn't change, I added a test case
>>> for the PKSC11 provider to the Bugzilla (which passes with the
>>> "SunPKCS11-NSS" provider without any changes).
>>>
>> That's great. Would you mind to contribute the regression test for
>> PKCS11 provider?
>>
>
> It's been attached to the bug report: https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/show_bug.cgi?id=100316
>
Thanks Andrew!
> Is there any reason the original patch can't be committed? I haven't seen any mentioned.
>
It is accepted. The minor comment I mentioned in the previous mail is
that we may want to merge the functions to trim leading zeros in one method.
There is a method sun.security.pkcs11.P11Util.trimZeroes(byte[] b) which
is used to trim leading zeros. I think it would be nice to move the
method to sun.security.util.KeyUtil, and make use of this method in the
patch of DHKeyAgreement.engineGenerateSecret(String algorithm) as well.
Pasi, what do you think?
Otherwise, the patch looks fine to me.
I can be the sponsor if you won't able to merge the changes into openJDk
workspace.
Thanks,
Xuelei
>> Thanks,
>> Xuelei
>>
>>> Best regards,
>>> Pasi
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 10:56 AM, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan at oracle.com
>>> <mailto:xuelei.fan at oracle.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Pasi,
>>>
>>> Thank you for your patience, and contribution to OpenJDK. The bug is
>>> accepted, and you should be able to review it at:
>>>
>>> http://bugs.sun.com/bugdatabase/view_bug.do?bug_id=8014618
>>>
>>> Let's use the above bug ID to track the issue.
>>>
>>> Your patch looks fine in general (I may have some very minor comments
>>> later). We also have similar problems in PKCS11 provider because of
>>> the
>>> update of P11KeyAgreement.java in changeset:
>>>
>>> http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk7u/jdk7u-gate/jdk/rev/e574e475c8a6
>>>
>>> Would you like to also fix it in your patch?
>>>
>>> Thanks again for your nice work.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Xuelei
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/10/2013 5:00 PM, Pasi Eronen wrote:
>>> > AKA "1 out of 256 SSL/TLS handshakes fails with DHE cipher suites"
>>> >
>>> > I reported this bug over a month of ago, but for some reason, it's
>>> > not
>>> > yet visible at bugs.sun.com <http://bugs.sun.com>
>>> <http://bugs.sun.com>. I've included the bug
>>> > report below just in
>>> > case.
>>> >
>>> > It seems this commit from March 2012 inadvertently broke SSL/TLS DHE
>>> > cipher suites, causing the SSL/TLS handshake to fail approximately
>>> > 1 out of 256 times:
>>> >
>>> > http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk7u/jdk7u-gate/jdk/rev/e574e475c8a6
>>> >
>>> > The commit was done to fix this bug:
>>> >
>>> > http://bugs.sun.com/view_bug.do?bug_id=7146728
>>> >
>>> > While generating a secret of the same length as modulus may be the
>>> right
>>> > choice generally speaking (and it's what e.g. IPsec uses), SSL/TLS
>>> uses
>>> > a different convention: leading zeroes must be stripped.
>>> >
>>> > This is currently blocking us from updating our production systems to
>>> > Java 7, so although I have not contributed to OpenJDK before, I'd
>>> > like
>>> > to submit a patch and a test case for this (I've signed the OCA
>>> > already). But before I do this, I'd like to check that the approach
>>> > is
>>> > agreeable.
>>> >
>>> > We have a separate "algorithm" value "TlsPremasterSecret", so
>>> > behavior for other cases could stay the same. Would a patch
>>> > like this:
>>> >
>>> > } else if (algorithm.equals("TlsPremasterSecret")) {
>>> > // remove leading zero bytes per RFC 5246 Section 8.1.2
>>> > int i = 0;
>>> > while ((i < secret.length - 1) && (secret[i] == 0)) {
>>> > i++;
>>> > }
>>> > if (i == 0) {
>>> > return new SecretKeySpec(secret, "TlsPremasterSecret");
>>> > } else {
>>> > byte[] secret2 = new byte[secret.length - i];
>>> > System.arraycopy(secret, i, secret2, 0, secret2.length);
>>> > return new SecretKeySpec(secret2, "TlsPremasterSecret");
>>> > }
>>> > }
>>> >
>>> > Plus a test case (with fixed keys) that checks that leading zero is
>>> > stripped
>>> > for TlsPremasterSecret and is not stripped otherwise, be sufficient?
>>> >
>>> > Best regards,
>>> > Pasi
>>> >
>>> > ---snip---
>>> >
>>> > Synopsis:
>>> > DHKeyAgreement calculates wrong TlsPremasterSecret 1 out of 256 times
>>> >
>>> > Full OS version:
>>> > Tested on Windows 7 (Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]), but
>>> occurs in
>>> > e..g OpenJDK 7 as well.
>>> >
>>> > Development Kit or Runtime version:
>>> > java version "1.7.0_17"
>>> > Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build 1.7.0_17-b02)
>>> > Java HotSpot(TM) Client VM (build 23.7-b01, mixed mode, sharing)
>>> >
>>> > Description:
>>> > When performing Diffie-Hellman key agreement for SSL/TLS, the TLS
>>> > specification (RFC 5246) says that "Leading bytes of Z that
>>> contain all zero
>>> > bits are stripped before it is used as the pre_master_secret."
>>> >
>>> > However, com.sun.crypto.provider.DHKeyAgreement.java does not
>>> strip leading
>>> > zero bytes. This causes approximately 1 out 256 SSL/TLS handshakes
>>> with
>>> > DH/DHE cipher suites to fail (when the leading byte happens, by
>>> chance, to
>>> > be zero).
>>> >
>>> > Steps to Reproduce:
>>> > 1. Start a simple JSSE socket server with -Djavax.net.debug=all.
>>> >
>>> > 2. Connect to the server with e.g. OpenSSL command line tool,
>>> ensuring that
>>> > DHE cipher suite gets selected (e.g. "openssl s_client -cipher
>>> > DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA -connect 192.168.81.1:9999
>>> <http://192.168.81.1:9999>
>>> > <http://192.168.81.1:9999>") repeatedly. Other SSL
>>> > clients can be used -- this is not an OpenSSL bug (see below).
>>> >
>>> > 3. Repeat the connection. After a couple of hundred successful
>>> connections,
>>> > the connection will fail with handshake_failure alert.
>>> >
>>> > 4. Examine the JSSE debug logs produced by the server: the failed
>>> connection
>>> > will have a PreMaster secret that begins with zero byte
>>> > (while all other connections have non-zero byte here). For example:
>>> >
>>> > SESSION KEYGEN:
>>> > PreMaster Secret:
>>> > 0000: 00 70 C5 7E 91 38 C8 DE ED 75 3D 76 8A B5 44 69
>>> .p...8...u=v..Di
>>> > 0010: E7 32 1C EE 80 77 50 C7 A9 51 24 2E E3 15 11 30
>>> .2...wP..Q$....0
>>> > 0020: 9D F6 9F BC 9D EB 5C 18 F7 A4 19 ED 1A AC 2E 0C
>>> ......\.........
>>> > 0030: E3 18 C5 11 B1 80 07 7D B1 C6 70 A8 D7 EB CF DD
>>> ..........p.....
>>> > 0040: 2D B5 1D BC 01 3E 28 2A 2B 5B 38 8F EB 20 F2 A2
>>> -....>(*+[8.. ..
>>> > 0050: 00 07 47 F7 87 B8 99 CB EF B4 13 04 C8 8B 82 FB
>>> ..G.............
>>> >
>>> > Expected Result:
>>> > Expected result is that every connection succeed.
>>> >
>>> > Actual Result:
>>> > Roughly one out of 256 connections fail.
>>> >
>>> > Source code for an executable test case:
>>> >
>>> > Java server:
>>> >
>>> > import javax.net.ssl.SSLServerSocket;
>>> > import javax.net.ssl.SSLServerSocketFactory;
>>> > import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket;
>>> >
>>> > public class TestServer {
>>> > public static void main(String args[]) throws Exception {
>>> > SSLServerSocketFactory ssf = (SSLServerSocketFactory)
>>> > SSLServerSocketFactory.getDefault();
>>> > SSLServerSocket ss = (SSLServerSocket)
>>> ssf.createServerSocket(9999);
>>> > System.out.println("Listening on port 9999");
>>> > for (String cs : ss.getEnabledCipherSuites()) {
>>> > System.out.println(cs);
>>> > }
>>> > while (true) {
>>> > SSLSocket s = (SSLSocket) ss.accept();
>>> > System.out.println("Connected with
>>> > "+s.getSession().getCipherSuite());
>>> > s.close();
>>> > }
>>> > }
>>> > }
>>> >
>>> > Run as as follows:
>>> >
>>> > keytool -storepass "password" -keypass "password" -genkey -keyalg RSA
>>> > -keystore test_keystore.jks -dname CN=test
>>> > javac TestServer.java
>>> > java -Djavax.net.debug=all
>>> -Djavax.net.ssl.keyStore=./test_keystore.jks
>>> > -Djavax.net.ssl.keyStorePassword=password TestServer
>>> >
>>> > OpenSSL client:
>>> >
>>> > set -e
>>> > while true; do
>>> > openssl s_client -cipher DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA -connect
>>> 127.0.0.1:9999 <http://127.0.0.1:9999>
>>> > <http://127.0.0.1:9999> -quiet -no_ign_eof < /dev/null
>>> > done
>>> >
>>> > Workaround:
>>> > Disable Diffie-Hellman cipher suites.
>>> >
>>> > ---snip---
>>> >
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>
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