TLS ALPN Proposal v2

Michael McMahon michael.x.mcmahon at oracle.com
Fri Jun 5 09:31:42 UTC 2015


I've just noticed the SSLParameters.setUseCipherSuitesOrder() method.
I guess this can be used to enforce a higher priority for the h2 
compatible ciphers
on the server side.

On the new API, I'm not sure about the SSLBase, SSLFunction construct 
either.
I don't think it is very clear, and if its purpose is just to allow use 
of lambdas,
then I think the original approach was better.

Michael.

On 05/06/15 05:11, Xuelei Fan wrote:
> Hi,
>
> See inlines, please.
>
> On 6/5/2015 5:30 AM, Simone Bordet wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 6:50 PM, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan at oracle.com> wrote:
>>> Hm, I see your point now.  But I may not agree with your ALPN "MUST
>>> happen after" protocol/cipher suite negotiation conclusion.
>>>
>>> I parse this section as, a H2 server must be strong enough(comply to
>>> RFC7540), and a H2 client must also be strong enough (comply to
>>> RFC7540).  Otherwise, both side may terminated the connection, and
>>> cannot declare as complying to H2.  It is not necessary for an
>>> application protocol selector to detect whether a H2 server/client
>>> comply to H2 or not.
>>>
>>> If "H2" is requested, it means that the client supports H2. Otherwise,
>>> it's a client application bug.
>> Not that simple, see below.
>>
>>> If "H2" is selected by a selected, it
>>> means that the selected server supports H2.  Otherwise, it is a selector
>>> implementation bug.  If something wrong in either client or server, it
>>> is expected to terminate the connection immediately, rather than
>>> downgrade to a not-strong enough level.
>>>
>>>  From the points above, I think an application protocol selector may not
>>> need to know the negotiated protocol version and cipher suite.
>> No.
>>
>> The client may send ciphers that are valid for http/1.1 (but invalid
>> for h2), along with ciphers that are good for h2 (as well as http/1.1
>> of course), plus the list of protocols it supports.
>> The client has no idea what the server supports.
>>
> I think it should be true that if a client requests h2, the client MUST
> support H2 and the requested cipher suites MUST contains at least one H2
> required cipher suite.  Otherwise, it's bug in client side.
>
>> When the server sees that the client supports h2, it MUST pick a
>> cipher that is valid for h2.
>> Alternatively, the ciphers on the server are sorted so that those
>> valid for h2 have higher priority (they are attempted before all the
>> others), so that there is a high chance that a h2 valid cipher is
>> chosen (but no guarantee) before choosing the application protocol.
>> When the application protocol selector callback is invoked, it can
>> only pick h2 IFF the cipher is h2 valid, otherwise it has to fallback
>> to http/1.1.
>>
> I think it should be true that if a server can negotiate h2, the server
> MUST support H2 and the enabled cipher suites MUST contains at least one
> H2 required cipher suite.  Otherwise, it's bug in server side.
>
> It's instinctive that if a server support h2, and then the application
> protocol selector would select h2.  If the server declare to support h2,
> but no suitable cipher suites, it may be a server bug.  The connection
> should be terminated rather than downgrade to HTTP/1.1, I think.
>
> Is it possible that client only request h2_valid_cipher_a, but server
> only support h2_valid_cipher_b, and as would result in that there is no
> common cipher suites between client and server for H2?  It is possible,
> surely.  Should the connection be terminated, or fall-back to HTTP/1.1?
>   I think connection should be terminated immediately, rather than
> fall-back to HTTP/1.1.  Per page 68, section 9.2.2, RFC 7540, there is
> an mandatory cipher suite (TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) MUST
> be supported in both client and server.  If there is no common cipher
> suites between client and server for H2, it is actually a bad
> deployments, and the connection should be terminated rather than
> fall-back to HTTP/1.1.  Version downgrading is not a safe behavior, I think.
>
>> With your reasoning, the client can send [h2_invalid_cipher,
>> h2_valid_cipher], the server may pick h2_invalid_cipher, then the
>> application protocol selector is invoked, which will only look at the
>> protocols, pick h2 since it's supported by client and server, and now
>> you have an invalid connection: the h2 protocol with
>> h2_invalid_cipher.
>>
> That's an interesting case.  The question actually is: between requested
> application protocols and cipher suites, which preference should be
> respected at first.  Because it is a application requirement that a
> certain cipher suite is not suitable to H2, I think requested
> application protocols should be respected at first.
>
> My scenarios look like:
> 1. client sends [h2_invalid_cipher, h2_valid_cipher] and h2/http/1.1
> application protocol.
> 2. server selects h2 (we need an API for the selection).
> 3. server selects h2_valid_cipher because of h2 is selected previously
> (may need an API for the selection).
>
> In #1, if there is no h2_valid_cipher requested, it is a bug in client side.
> In #3, if there is no h2_valid_cipher that can be negotiated, it is a
> bug in server side, or the client does not enabled the mandatory cipher
> suite (a bug in client).
>
>> We have been through these issues for months in the RFC 7540 expert
>> group, and the outcome is that protocol selection, for h2, depends on
>> the cipher.
>> We have also been through a number of scenarios where both the client
>> and the server send h2 valid ciphers, but their intersection is empty
>> (this may happen when a very old client talks to a very new server,
>> think TLS 1.2 vs TLS 1.4, or viceversa).
>> Same outcome: to pick h2 you MUST have a h2 valid cipher in common
>> between client and server, so application protocol selection, for h2,
>> depends on the cipher.
>>
> I still cannot understand the outcome.  I think, if there is no h2 valid
> cipher in common, the connection should be terminated as there is a bug
> in client or server side (see above).
>
> I'm not familiar with HTTP/2 protocol, can you share more scenarios that
> application protocol selection depends on the cipher?
>
>> A bit of warning here: we are designing an API for ALPN, not for HTTP/2.
>> The ALPN API should be flexible enough to implement *at least* HTTP/2,
>> possibly even more complex scenarios (for example alias selection),
>> but IMHO it should not be tied to HTTP/2.
>>
> Yes.  That's what I intended to do now.  It's very bad if application
> protocol selection depends on the negotiation of TLS protocols, cipher
> suites, or other handshake attributes, or other Chicken/Eggs dependence.
> As would make the JSSE provider hard to be implemented, and the API hard
> to be used.  That's what I want to avoid in JSSE layer.
>
>> Again, I see 2 cases: either the JDK implementation picks the TLS
>> protocol, the cipher and the alias like it does now, and then invokes
>> the "callback" to pick the application protocol (current Jetty ALPN
>> behavior), or the implementation must be reviewed to perform TLS
>> protocol, cipher, alias and application protocol selection at once,
>> with a "callback" that will be invoked possibly multiple times until
>> it can find the right tuple to return.
>>
> The former has a drawback that the cipher may not suitable for the
> application protocol.  It's application protocol define with cipher
> suite is suitable (RFC7540), not cipher suite define which application
> protocol is suitable.  So application protocol should be selected at
> first, and let the specific application protocol determines the
> negotiable cipher suite.
>
> The latter made the TLS implementation pretty complicated.  It is even
> not doable actually in general. Too much attributes need to be
> considered if more handshake properties are involved, such as
> certificate, key parameters, etc.
>
> See also my previous mail about the rerouting requirement.
>
> I think application-layer protocol negotiation should happen before the
> actually general-handshaking (TLS protocol, cipher suite, general
> extension negotiation).  For any incoming ClientHello message, the
> scenarios in server side is as simple as:
> 1. select the right application-layer protocols.
> 2. do the actual general handshaking.  If something failed, terminate
> the connection.
>
> I'm not familiar with HTTP/2, I'm open to hear more case why above
> scenarios does not work.
>
>> The latter would be the optimal solution, the former has certainly
>> working implementations.
>>
>> Hope this clarified.
>>
>> Thanks !
>>
> Thank you very much for the discussion of the potential issue.  It's an
> effective way for us to understand what's the best option and what's the
> actual requirement in the industry.
>
> Thanks,
> Xuelei
>



More information about the security-dev mailing list