TlsRsaPremasterSecretParameterSpec
Patchell Jonathan
jonathan.patchell at gemalto.com
Thu Feb 9 21:14:41 UTC 2017
Hi Sean,
I am using 8u121 and I have raised a bug at http://bugreport.java.com/. I haven't received any response but the internal review ID was: 9047607.
Regards,
Jonathan Patchell
Senior Software Developer
Gemalto
From: Seán Coffey [mailto:sean.coffey at oracle.com]
Sent: February-08-17 8:21 AM
To: Gardiner Michael <Michael.Gardiner at gemalto.com>; Patchell Jonathan <jonathan.patchell at gemalto.com>; security-dev at openjdk.java.net
Subject: Re: TlsRsaPremasterSecretParameterSpec
What version of JDK 8u are you running with ? There's been a few tweaks in this code area which might help you.
https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8149017
https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8158111
If you can reproduce with 8u121, please log an issue via http://bugreport.java.com/ (or JBS if you have an account) - We need to be aware of such issues.
Regards,
Sean.
On 07/02/17 21:29, Gardiner Michael wrote:
Hello Java Security Developers
We had a discussion a year and a bit ago about the TlsRsaPremasterSecretParameterSpec being used in a way that doesn't seem to make sense. I've attached the email from 2015, but the same question has arisen.
It seems that the JSSE is expecting RSA Ciphers to be able to handle TlsRsaPremasterSecretParameterSpec. Is the TlsRsaPremasterSecretParameterSpec class going to move out of the status of "@deprecated Sun JDK internal use only --- WILL BE REMOVED in a future release" towards something that will be expected of RSA cipher instances to interoperate with the JSSE?
This is a blocking issue currently with at least one large customer. We could add some code in our provider to inspect if the parameter spec sent is of the offending type, but I'd really rather not have to handle a deprecated class that was never intended to be used outside of the Sun code base.
My current advice to this customer is:
1. Roll back to a previous version of Java that's not affected by this behaviour change
2. Ensure the use of PFS cipher suites so the RSA key is used only for identity and not key exchange
But both of those pieces of advice may not be practical in their situation.
Regards,
Mike Gardiner
Systems Security Architect
Gemalto
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