RFC: Add new JCA provider to support hardware RNGs

Gustavo Romero gromero at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Wed Jun 20 00:59:58 UTC 2018


Hi,

Please, could I get comments on the following change?

Since it's related to security, I would be glad if security
experts could also comment on that.

webrev: http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~gromero/POWER9/darn/v6_rebased/

It introduces a way to get benefits from hardware instructions in userspace
that can delivery a random number and so be used to speed up and avoid
blocking in some SecureRandom methods, notably generateSeed() and
nextBytes(), without loosing the random number quality. Particularly on
Power, the new POWER9 CPUs introduced a hardware instruction called 'darn'
that can be used for that purpose.

The main idea is to add a new JCA provider called "HWTRNG" (if no better
name is suggested), adding new helper methods that can then be intrinsified
and that will be used  by generateSeed() and nextBytes(). In that sense,
this change also adds the proper mechanisms in the Interpreter,
C1 Compiler, and C2 compiler (for PPC64, but also paving the way for other
platforms) to intrinsify these helper methods that will be used in the end
by generateSeed() and nextBytes() methods. The added helpers are:

   byte[] getRandomSequence0(int)
   byte[] getRandomSequence1(byte[])
   long validRandomLong(void)
   long randomLong(void)

The helpers also take care of checking if the returned random number is
valid and attempt 10 times (as recommended by ISA) get a valid random
number before falling back to a software alternative (HWTRNG is based
mostly on JCA provider NativePRNG and so the fall back mechanism will use
the exactly same methods found in NativePRNG and hence behave similarly.
Nonetheless, in my experience such a hardware failures (which are the main
cause of a returned invalid random number) are quite rare: in my tests I
was never able to exhaust the HW RNG and force it to generate an invalid
random number).

The user, besides having to specify explicitly the use of a non-default
provider (HWTRNG), will have to unlock the VM experimental options to
effectively use the hardware RNG as an unique random source by passing
options "-XX:+UnlockExperimentalVMOptions -XX:+UseRANDOMIntrinsics".

On Power, for the Interpreter and C1 Compiler, besides avoiding the
blocking effect of a low entropy on /dev/random, I was able to get about
126 Mbps (3x higher than the version without 'darn') on generaSeed() and
nextBytes(). The maximum theoretical value on a POWER9 machine is usually
128 Mbps.

I'll address the details about the file headers (Copyright, dates, authors,
versions, etc) after I get some feedback about this change.


Thanks in advance.

Best regards,
Gustavo



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