RFR CSR 8202590: Customizing the generation of a PKCS12 keystore

[Michael StJohns]

On 5/5/2018 3:38 AM, Weijun Wang wrote:
> Please take a review of
>
>     https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8202590
>
> This enhancement has two major purposes:
>
> 1. Provide a way to change encryption and Mac algorithms used in PKCS 12.
>
> 2. The ability to create a password-less PKCS 12 keystore containing unencrypted certificates and no Mac.
>
> Especially, the long paragraph in the spec on behavior of an existing keystore makes sure that once a password-less keystore is generated (with -Dkeystore.pkcs12.certProtectionAlgorithm=NONE and -Dkeystore.pkcs12.macAlgorithm=NONE), one can add new certificates to it without any special setting and keep it password-less.
>
> Thanks
> Max
>

|I think you want to break this into two parts - the first part 
specifies the algorithm used to convert a password into key material. 
The second defines the algorithms used for protection for the various parts.
# password to key material scheme
.pbkdf=PBKDF2withHMAC-SHA256  (Form is base function with the PRF)
# PKCS12 macData
.macAlgorithm=HMAC-SHA256  # this is the algorithm for the PKCS12 
macData component, if NONE, this component is not present
# protection scheme for PKCS8ShroudedKeyBagn if NONE, then a PKCS8KeyBag 
is produced instead.
.keyProtectionAlgorithm=AES-KWA
#protection scheme for certificates - produces an encryptedData object 
encrypted under the scheme, or a certBag object if "NONE" is specified
.certProtectionAlgorithm=NONE


Second, you probably want to do this as multi-choice entries in the 
java.security file ala providers:

.pbkdf.0=PBKDF2withSHA256
.pbkdf.9=PBKDF1withSHA1 # the current default aka pbe

So that you can specify a somewhat secure default, but still allow for 
providers that don't implement the stronger versions.

This requires a bit more work in figuring out what the embedded OIDs 
should be, and there is always the chance of mismatch, but it turns out 
there is the chance of mismatch even in the proposed version if you have 
protection algorithms coming from two different PBE schemes.

Specifying it this way is closer to the PKCS5 2.0 model rather than 
PKCS12 and matches the recommendations in the IETF's version of PKCS12.  
You also *really* don't want to use two different KDFs with the same 
password.

Mike




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