RFR [14] 8214483: Remove algorithms that use MD5, DES, or ECB from security requirements

[Bernd Eckenfels]

Hello,

While it is probably a good thing to not use ECB I can imagine you actually need it to implement single-block operations, so I am not sure if it’s a good idea if any general purpose JVM does not provide AES/ECB or RSA/ECB? (Maybe a new raw single block mode instead?)

For example TLS1.2 handshakes would need RSA/ECB/NoPadding and AES Key Exchange in smime would need AES/ECB as the primitive.

On the other hand, requiring 3DES might really not be a requirement anymore, while at it remove it, also?

Gruss
Bernd
--
http://bernd.eckenfels.net

________________________________
Von: security-dev <security-dev-bounces at openjdk.java.net> im Auftrag von Sean Mullan <sean.mullan at oracle.com>
Gesendet: Mittwoch, November 6, 2019 5:28 PM
An: security Dev OpenJDK
Betreff: RFR [14] 8214483: Remove algorithms that use MD5, DES, or ECB from security requirements

Please remove this change to remove the Java SE requirements to
implement security algorithms based on DES, MD5, or ECB. It makes sense
to periodically review these requirements and remove algorithms or modes
that are known to be weak and of which usage has declined significantly
and thus compatibility risk is much lower.

Note that we are not removing the actual implementations of these
algorithms from the JDK. This just means that an SE implementation is
not required to support these algorithms.

webrev: https://cr.openjdk.java.net/~mullan/webrevs/8214483/webrev.00/
CSR: https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8233607

Thanks,
Sean

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