RFR [14] 8214483: Remove algorithms that use MD5, DES, or ECB from security requirements

[Mike StJohns]

You deleted DES but not DESede.   Was that intentional?

Sent from my iPad

> On Nov 7, 2019, at 17:12, Sean Mullan <sean.mullan at oracle.com> wrote:
> 
> Ok, I have put back the Cipher algorithms with ECB mode that I had previously removed (except for DES/ECB which is still removed).
> 
> Updated webrev: https://cr.openjdk.java.net/~mullan/webrevs/8214483/webrev.01/
> 
> --Sean
> 
>> On 11/6/19 5:43 PM, Michael StJohns wrote:
>>> On 11/6/2019 11:27 AM, Sean Mullan wrote:
>>> Please remove this change to remove the Java SE requirements to implement security algorithms based on DES, MD5, or ECB. It makes sense to periodically review these requirements and remove algorithms or modes that are known to be weak and of which usage has declined significantly and thus compatibility risk is much lower.
>>> 
>>> Note that we are not removing the actual implementations of these algorithms from the JDK. This just means that an SE implementation is not required to support these algorithms.
>>> 
>>> webrev: https://cr.openjdk.java.net/~mullan/webrevs/8214483/webrev.00/
>>> CSR: https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8233607
>>> 
>>> Thanks,
>>> Sean
>>> 
>> I don't have a problem with removing  DES or MD5 from the must-implement list, but ECB is a fundamental building block mode.  It's going to be how you implement a new mode before there's specific support for that mode.   Pretty much any mode can be implemented using ECB as its only real crypto operation.   E.g. CBC, CTR, CCM, GCM, CFB, OFB etc are all wrapped around ECB in some form.   Please continue to require that it be implemented. Policy MAY restrict the use of the mode for a given key, but that's a provider issue.
>> Mike