RFR: 8245527: LDAP Cnannel Binding support for Java GSS/Kerberos
Alexey Bakhtin
alexey at azul.com
Fri Jun 5 15:03:10 UTC 2020
Hello Max,
Thank you a lot for review.
Could you check the new version of the patch :
http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~abakhtin/8245527/webrev.v4/
I’ve made the following changes:
- TlsChannelBinding class is moved to java.naming module.
java.security.sasl module is not affected any more
- I pass tlsCB.getData() directly to the SASL mechanism as you suggested
- I’ve made some guards to prevent application from using "com.sun.security.sasl.tlschannelbinding” property directly:
- LdapClient verifies if internal property is not set
- GssKrb5Client uses props.remove() to read and remove internal property
Regards
Alexey
> On 5 Jun 2020, at 06:41, Weijun Wang <weijun.wang at oracle.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Alexey,
>
> It's so unfortunate that different addressType must be used. I'm OK with the new TlsChannelBindingImpl class.
>
> One thing I'm not comfortable is the java.security.sasl/share/classes/module-info.java change. We've struggled hard to avoid these kind of secret tunnels. Is it possible to pass the tlsCB.getData() directly to the SASL mechanism? The property name is clear enough to avoid any misuse.
>
> Another question: can an application user set the "com.sun.security.sasl.tlschannelbinding" property? and can they read it after it's set internally? I cannot think of a good attack now but at least it seems they have no need to access that property value. If we keep it internal then we also have the chance to modify the approach later.
>
> Thanks,
> Max
>
>
>> On Jun 5, 2020, at 2:15 AM, Alexey Bakhtin <alexey at azul.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>> Could you please review new version of the patch:
>> http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~abakhtin/8245527/webrev.v3/
>>
>> I’ve moved all logic for creating TLS Channel Binding data out of GssKrb5Client.java file.
>> All data is prepared inside TlsChannelBinding class.
>> Internal property name is renamed to “com.sun.security.sasl.tlschannelbinding”.
>> TlsChannelBinding object is still used to pass channel binding data from LdapClient to GssKrb5Client.
>> I do not change it to byte[] because of TlsChannelBinding class is still used for internal property name.
>> Also, I’ve updated TlsChannelBinding class to select SHA-256 hash algorithm if it can not be derived
>> from the certificate signature name.
>>
>> Regards
>> Alexey
>>
>>
>>> On 26 May 2020, at 17:50, Weijun Wang <weijun.wang at oracle.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> I have a question on GssKrb5Client.java:
>>>
>>> Do you think it's a good idea to let the SASL mechanism understand what TLS binding is? Instead of passing the whole TlsChannelBinding object through a SASL property, is it possible to only pass the actual cbData? After all, the name "com.sun.security.sasl.channelbinding" suggests it's just a general ChannelBinding which is independent with any application level info.
>>>
>>> From my reading of the code change, it looks like this cbData can be calculated on the LDAP side.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Max
>>>
>>>> On May 21, 2020, at 3:35 PM, Alexey Bakhtin <alexey at azul.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hello,
>>>>
>>>> Could you please review the following patch:
>>>>
>>>> JBS: https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8245527
>>>> Webrev: http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~abakhtin/8245527/webrev.v0/
>>>>
>>>> The Windows LDAP server with LdapEnforceChannelBinding=2 uses the tls-server-end-point channel binding
>>>> (based on the TLS server certificate). The channel binding data is calculated as following :
>>>> • The client calculates a hash of the TLS server certificate.
>>>> The hash algorithm is selected on the base of the certificate signature algorithm.
>>>> Also, the client should use SHA-256 algorithm, in case of the certificate signature algorithm is SHA1 or MD5 based
>>>> • The channel binding information is the same as defined in rfc4121 [1] with small corrections:
>>>> • initiator and acceptor addresses should be set to NULL
>>>> • initiator and acceptor address types should be zero.
>>>> It contradicts to the “Using Channel Bindings in GSS-API” document [2] that say that
>>>> the address type should be set to GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR=0xFF,
>>>> instead of GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC=0x00.
>>>>
>>>> This patch introduces changes in the LDAP, SASL and JGSS modules
>>>> to generate channel binding data automatically if requested by an application.
>>>> This patch reuses existing org.ietf.jgss.ChannelBinding class implementation but changes
>>>> initial unspecified address type from CHANNEL_BINDING_AF_NULL_ADDR to CHANNEL_BINDING_AF_UNSPEC.
>>>> The patch introduces new environment property “com.sun.jndi.ldap.tls.cbtype” that indicates
>>>> Channel Binding type that should be used in the LDAPS connection over JGSS/Kerberos.
>>>> Right now "tls-server-end-point" Channel Binding type is supported only.
>>>> The client extracts server certificate from the underlying TLS connection and creates
>>>> Channel Binding data for JGSS/Kerberos authentication if application indicates
>>>> com.sun.jndi.ldap.tls.cbtype=tls-server-end-point property.
>>>> Client application should also specify existing "com.sun.jndi.ldap.connect.timeout” property
>>>> to force and wait TLS handshake completion before JGSS/Kerberos authentication data is generated.
>>>>
>>>> [1] - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4121#section-4.1.1.2
>>>>
>>>> [2] -
>>>> https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19120-01/open.solaris/819-2145/overview-52/index.html
>>>>
>>>> Initial discussion of this issue is available at security-dev list:
>>>> https://mail.openjdk.java.net/pipermail/security-dev/2019-December/021052.html
>>>> https://mail.openjdk.java.net/pipermail/security-dev/2020-January/021140.html
>>>> https://mail.openjdk.java.net/pipermail/security-dev/2020-February/021278.html
>>>> https://mail.openjdk.java.net/pipermail/security-dev/2020-May/021864.html
>>
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