JEP 411, removal of finalizers, a path forward.
Sean Mullan
sean.mullan at oracle.com
Tue Aug 3 16:40:58 UTC 2021
On 8/2/21 8:28 PM, Peter Firmstone wrote:
> In JGDMS without SM, at least the following must be addressed to
> maintain security:
>
> 1. TLS and Kerberos connections cannot be established. (My software is
> littered with doPrivileged calls that preserve the Subject, we don't
> have anon TLS connections, we require client certificates).
As mentioned several times, this use case will be preserved and is
already covered in JEP 411: https://openjdk.java.net/jeps/411#subject-doas
> 2. All remote connections are authorized to load classes.
Not sure why you can't do something with a custom ClassLoader that only
loads classes for authorized users.
> 3. All remote connections are authorized to perform deserialization.
Depending on serialization long-term seems somewhat dubious.
> Having established that OpenJDK is not yet willing to compromise, I have
> been attempting to create an authorization layer using Agents, so that I
> can restore perimeter security following the removal of SM and support
> future versions of Java. It is my hope that either I will be
> successful in recreating an authorization layer, or that enough people
> come forward and OpenJDK decides there are enough affected developers to
> find a compromise that either makes migration practical, or less expensive.
You may have some interesting ideas, but in my opinion you have not
presented them in a clear and easily digestible manner, and your long
emails are time consuming to read, repetitive and often diverge into
rants. (Keep in mind there are many people on the jdk-dev alias, and a
lot of them may not care about this topic). It is to the point where I
only skim your emails quickly. I would take the time to write up your
ideas in an external place. It may not go anywhere, but at least you
would have a single place where your proposal, experiments, etc are
documented.
--Sean
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