RFR: 8277246: No need to check about KeyUsage when validating a TSA certificate [v2]

[Weijun Wang]

On Tue, 16 Nov 2021 21:00:12 GMT, Weijun Wang <weijun at openjdk.org> wrote:

>> There is no need to check for the KeyUsage extension when validating a TSA certificate.
>> 
>> A test is modified where a TSA cert has a KeyUsage but without the DigitalSignature bit.
>
> Weijun Wang has updated the pull request incrementally with one additional commit since the last revision:
> 
>   clarify RFC requirement

Really? The TSA is http://timestamp.digicert.com and the cert chain is

CN=DigiCert Timestamp 2021, O="DigiCert, Inc.", C=US
KeyUsage: DigitalSignature
ExtendedKeyUsages: timeStamping

CN=DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Timestamping CA, OU=www.digicert.com, O=DigiCert Inc, C=US
KeyUsage: DigitalSignature,  Key_CertSign, Crl_Sign
ExtendedKeyUsages: timeStamping

You mean this CA can be used for time stamping as well? I understand that when KU is using you can find out its usage in EKU (vice versa), but here it's a CA that can sign cert and CRLs. Does it really need to act as the end entity cert of a TSA server?

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PR: https://git.openjdk.java.net/jdk/pull/6416