Disabled brainpool curves

[Sean Mullan]

On 12/13/22 2:39 AM, benjamin.marwell at f-i.de wrote:
> Hi everyone!
> 
> I just stumbled over “Disable weak named curves”, e.g.
> 
> • https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8235540
> • http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~alexsch/sercher/8233228/webrev.00/src/share/lib/security/java.security-aix.udiff.html
> 
> Interestingly, brainpoolP512r1 is on that list.
> Just a few weeks ago I cited someone from the German BSI who debunked the myth that brainpool ciphers are weak [1]].
> They are only weak on TLSv1.3 if used not properly.
> 
> Please revert this change ASAP. It will break a lot of cryptography for no reason.
> Additionally, JDK-8235540 doesn't even mention how this list was chosen.

The reason for removing the brainpool curves was previously explained in 
my post: 
https://mail.openjdk.org/pipermail/security-dev/2022-November/033171.html

As I also said in that post, we would be open to reviewing contributions 
from the community for reintroducing support for brainpool but they 
would need to be done using the current design structure and using 
complete formulas.

Thanks,
Sean

> 
> Here's the quote again from Manfred Lochter, how works at the BSI:
> 
>> The unfortunate wording about the brainpool curves originated in TLS 1.3,
>> however RFC 8734 makes the curves usable for TLS again.
>> We will continue to recommend the Brainpool curves.
>> It should also be noted that the arguments for the "modern formulas" have all been refuted by now.
>> Especially the implementation of Curve 25519 requires more effort to protect against SCA;
>> the deterministic signatures are vulnerable to fault injection.
>> In the medium term, however, the switch to post-quantum cryptography is necessary;
>> there are comprehensive recommendations on this at [2]
> 
> Please be aware that other users are already +1'd this [3].
> 
> - Ben
> 
> [1]: https://mail.openjdk.org/pipermail/security-dev/2022-November/033108.html
> [2]: https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisationen/Informationen-und-Empfehlungen/Quantentechnologien-und-Post-Quanten-Kryptografie/quantentechnologien-und-post-quanten-kryptografie_node.html
> [3]: https://mail.openjdk.org/pipermail/security-dev/2022-November/033428.html