RFR: 8305091: Change ChaCha20 cipher init behavior to match AES-GCM

Xue-Lei Andrew Fan xuelei at openjdk.org
Tue Apr 11 18:18:38 UTC 2023


On Tue, 11 Apr 2023 17:26:25 GMT, Jamil Nimeh <jnimeh at openjdk.org> wrote:

> This fixes an issue where the key/nonce reuse policy for SunJCE ChaCha20 and ChaCha20-Poly1305 was overly strict in enforcing no-reuse when the Cipher was in DECRYPT_MODE.  For decryption, this should be allowed and be consistent with the AES-GCM decryption initialization behavior.
> 
> - Issue: https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8305091
> - CSR: https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8305822

In the decryption side, does it sound like good to detect and reject key/nonce reuse for security reason(i.e., if key/nonce is reused, the decryption side will not accept the encryption)?  Did you known real problems in practice for the key/nonce reuse for decryption?

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PR Comment: https://git.openjdk.org/jdk/pull/13428#issuecomment-1503872733



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