[BUG] JGSS is querying wrong realm for service ticket and fails ultimately

Osipov, Michael (IN IT IN) michael.osipov at innomotics.com
Fri Aug 30 09:09:16 UTC 2024


Folks,

please consider the following case/bug with JGSS:
Tried with OpenJDK 8u4xx, can try newer, but doubt that it will be any 
different.

* KDCs are Active Directory
* Machine: member of INNOMOTICS.NET
* krb5.conf: Default realm is INNOMOTICS.NET
* Client: Logged in from a different realm in this machine: 
foo at AD001.SIEMENS.NET
* One-way trust from AD001.SIEMENS.NET, means with an account from 
AD001.SIEMENS.NET you can access resources from both realms, but you 
cannot access resources from AD001.SIEMENS.NET with your INNOMOTICS.NET 
account. That is on purpose.

Use case:
Client wants to access AD DS via LDAP and authenticate with an SASL 
GSSAPI bind: ldap at dc1.ad001.siemens.net. Client and target realm are 
identical. AS-REQ, AS-REP from AD001.SIEMENS.NET are fine, now here is 
the problem: To form the TGS-REQ it requests a cross-realm TGT for 
INNOMOTICS.NET and then asks a KDC in INNOMOTICS.NET for a service 
ticket for ldap at dc1.ad001.siemens.net. This KDC of course says:
> 16174 >>>KRBError:
> 16175      sTime is Thu Aug 29 20:19:07 CEST 2024 1724955547000
> 16176      suSec is 106542
> 16177      error code is 7
> 16178      error Message is Server not found in Kerberos database
> 16179      sname is ldap/dc1.ad001.siemens.net at INNOMOTICS.NET
> 16180      msgType is 30

End of story. The bug for me is that, for some reason, JGSS assumes that 
the target is in the default realm of the machine instead of asking its 
own realm which should give it all necessary cross-realm referrals.

Here is what MIT Kerberos does:
> $ cat /etc/krb5.conf
> # Kerberos configuration
> 
> [libdefaults]
>     default_realm = INNOMOTICS.NET
>     forwardable = true
>     canonicalize = true
>     dns_lookup_kdc = true
>     dns_canonicalize_hostname = false
>     qualify_shortname = ""
>     rdns = false
>     udp_preference_limit = 1
>     kdc_timeout = 1000
>     max_retries = 1
> 
> $ klist
> Ticketzwischenspeicher: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_2011
> Standard-Principal: foo at AD001.SIEMENS.NET
> 
> Valid starting       Expires              Service principal
> 2024-08-30T10:13:05  2024-08-30T20:13:05  krbtgt/AD001.SIEMENS.NET at AD001.SIEMENS.NET
>         erneuern bis 2024-08-31T10:10:22
> 
> $ ldapwhoami -H ldap://ad001.siemens.net
> SASL/GSSAPI authentication started
> SASL username: foo at AD001.SIEMENS.NET
> SASL SSF: 256
> SASL data security layer installed.
> u:AD001\foo
> 
> $ klist
> Ticketzwischenspeicher: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_2011
> Standard-Principal: foo at AD001.SIEMENS.NET
> 
> Valid starting       Expires              Service principal
> 2024-08-30T10:13:05  2024-08-30T20:13:05  krbtgt/AD001.SIEMENS.NET at AD001.SIEMENS.NET
>         erneuern bis 2024-08-31T10:10:22
> 2024-08-30T10:13:19  2024-08-30T20:13:05  ldap/dc1.ad001.siemens.net@
>         erneuern bis 2024-08-31T10:10:22
>         Ticket server: ldap/dc1.ad001.siemens.net at AD001.SIEMENS.NET

Also looking at the output of KRB5_TRACE and pcaps MIT Kerberos never 
contacts any KDC in INNOMOTICS.NET.

The workaround is the following in krb5.conf:
> # JGSS does not use the client's realm to obtain a ticket and needs this hinT
> [domain_realm]
>     .ad001.siemens.net = AD001.SIEMENS.NET
>     ad001.siemens.net = AD001.SIEMENS.NET

This is ugly because:
* I have to do this on all affected machines and cannot rely on AD to 
give me the right referral
* if I have an SPN, e.g. HTTP/svc.ad001.siemens.net in INNOMOTICS.NET, a 
migrated machine from AD001.SIEMENS.NET to INNOMOTICS.NET available 
under multiple virtual hostnames the init_sec_context will likely fail 
because that SPN is not known AD001.SIEMENS.NET, I can hope that AD will 
send me a referral. But in any case it will incur unnecessary round 
trips. I need to explicitly exempt those hosts here throughout my setup.

Max, can you have a look at this? I can provide all the necessary 
debug/trace/pcap files to you. Just let me know what you would like to see.

Michael


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