RFR: 8272875: Change the default key manager to PKIX [v3]

Daniel Jeliński djelinski at openjdk.org
Mon May 5 08:52:50 UTC 2025


On Tue, 29 Apr 2025 21:51:00 GMT, Artur Barashev <abarashev at openjdk.org> wrote:

>> The current key manager is SunX509, which is configured in the java.security. The SunX509 algorithm does not check the local certificate. The PKIX algorithm should be preferred now so that the default key manager could be more robust.
>> 
>> Compatibility considerations:
>> 
>> 1) Customers using local certificates signed using algorithms prohibited by the default configuration (notably MD5 and SHA1) no longer will be able to use such certificates without modifying algorithm constraints in `java.security` config file.
>> 
>> 2) Performance impact: there is about x2 performance decrease for full (non-resume) TLS handshake:
>> 
>> **SUNX509**
>> Benchmark                                    (resume)  (tlsVersion)   Mode  Cnt      Score     Error  Units
>> SSLHandshake.doHandshake      true       TLSv1.2  thrpt   15  19758.012 ± 758.237  ops/s
>> SSLHandshake.doHandshake      true           TLS  thrpt   15   1861.695 ±  14.681  ops/s
>> SSLHandshake.doHandshake     false       TLSv1.2  thrpt   15   **1186.962** ±  12.085  ops/s
>> SSLHandshake.doHandshake     false           TLS  thrpt   15   **1056.288** ±   7.197  ops/s
>> Finished running test 'micro:java.security.SSLHandshake'
>> 
>> **PKIX**
>> Benchmark                                   (resume)  (tlsVersion)   Mode  Cnt      Score     Error  Units
>> SSLHandshake.doHandshake      true       TLSv1.2  thrpt   15  19724.887 ± 393.636  ops/s
>> SSLHandshake.doHandshake      true           TLS  thrpt   15   1848.927 ±  22.946  ops/s
>> SSLHandshake.doHandshake     false       TLSv1.2  thrpt   15    **511.684** ±   5.405  ops/s
>> SSLHandshake.doHandshake     false           TLS  thrpt   15    **490.698** ±   6.453  ops/s
>> Finished running test 'micro:java.security.SSLHandshake'
>
> Artur Barashev has updated the pull request incrementally with one additional commit since the last revision:
> 
>   Address review comments

Well, technically the current 1ms takes into account both the client side and the server side of the handshake. Last time I checked, they were more or less evenly split. The 1ms slowdown will happen entirely on the server side, so it's more of a 3x slowdown.

Most of the time an extra millisecond doesn't matter, but it can be a factor in the server startup time on a busy server. We currently invalidate all session resumption tickets during server restart.

Re your point 3: what's the observable difference? If the certificate we can offer doesn't meet the peer's expectations, will we fail the handshake on the server side instead of failing on the client side, or is it something else?

-------------

PR Comment: https://git.openjdk.org/jdk/pull/24756#issuecomment-2850325489


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