[security-dev 01657]: Re: Code review request: 6844909: support allow_weak_crypto in krb5.conf

Max (Weijun) Wang Weijun.Wang at Sun.COM
Tue Mar 2 00:54:03 UTC 2010


Hi Valerie

Thanks! All suggestions accepted.

Webrev updated at http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~weijun/6844909/webrev.01

Thanks again
Max


On Mar 2, 2010, at 8:44 AM, Valerie Peng wrote:

> Hi, Max,
> 
> Changes look fine, here are some minor comments:
> 1) In EType.java, line 60, 64 should be indented w/ one extra space.
> 2) In EType.java, there should be comments added to "BUILTIN_ETYPES", and "BUILTIN_ETYPES_NOAES256" mentioning about the first two entries are removed when ALLOW_WEAK_CRYPTO is false.
> 3) In EType.java, line 235 and 236 still mentions these weak crypto etypes regardless. Shouldn't it be updated?
> 
> Thanks,
> Valerie
> On 02/28/10 23:07, Max (Weijun) Wang wrote:
>> Hi Valerie
>> 
>> Can you please take a review on this fix?
>> 
>>    
>> http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~weijun/6844909/webrev.00
>> 
>> 
>> Basically, when "allow_weak_crypto = false" is set in krb5.conf's [libdefaults], DES-related etypes will not be used. Note that this setting also removes any weak etypes in the default_*_enctypes settings. This config was added in MIT's krb5-1.7 and defaults to false in 1.8. However, for compatibility (which we care a lot in Java), its default value is still true in Java.
>> 
>> Thanks
>> Max
>> 
>> 
>>   
>> 
>>> *Change Request ID*: 6844909
>>> 
>>> *Synopsis*: support allow_weak_crypto in krb5.conf
>>> 
>>> 
>>> === *Description* ============================================================
>>> Latest MIT krb5 supports a allow_weak_crypto key in krb5.conf, when set to true, disallows DES be used in all kinds of etypes. We can support it also.
>>> 
>>> Currently, MIT krb5's default value for this key is false, but it might become true one day.
>>> 
>>>     
>>> 
>> It's true in 1.8 now.
>> 
>>   
>> 
>>> *** (#1 of 1): 2009-05-26 03:50:36 GMT+00:00 weijun.wang at sun.com
>>> 
>>>     
>>> 
>> 
>>   
>> 
> 




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